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Abstract
Seven studies tested the hypothesis that people use subjective time progression in hedonic evaluation. When people believe that
time has passed unexpectedly quickly, they rate tasks as more engaging, noises as less irritating, and songs as more enjoyable.
We propose that felt time distortion operates as a metacognitive cue that people implicitly attribute to their enjoyment of an
experience (i.e., time flew, so the experience must have been fun). Consistent with this attribution account, the effects of felt
time distortion on enjoyment ratings were moderated by the need for attribution, the strength of the “time flies” naive theory,
and the presence of an alternative attribution. These findings suggest a previously unexplored process through which subjective
time progression can influence the hedonic evaluation of experiences.
Keywords
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Time perception is an integral part of psychological experience. However, because the duration of most meaningful
experiences outlasts the capacity of working memory, people
often have difficulty estimating how long experiences lasted.
For example, in one elaborate demonstration, speleologist
Michel Siffre spent 2 months isolated in a cave, away from the
natural and mechanical clocks outside. Upon emerging after
59 days, he underestimated his endeavor’s duration by a
staggering 25 days (Siffre, 1964). Subsequent empirical investigations suggest that duration estimates are influenced by
many factors, including attentional engagement (Chaston &
Kingstone, 2004), arousal (Campbell & Bryant, 2007; Gruber
& Block, 2003; Kellaris & Mantel, 1996; Loftus, Schooler,
Boone, & Kline, 1987; Stetson, Fiesta, & Eagleman, 2007),
and motivation (Conti, 2001; Sarason & Stroops, 1978; Vohs
& Schmeichel, 2003). Thus, subjective duration often diverges
from objective duration. When this occurs, time feels distorted: When time passes surprisingly quickly, it feels like
time flew by; when time passes surprisingly slowly, it feels
like time dragged on.1
The feeling of time distortion may prompt people to seek
an explanation. A ready answer may come from overgeneralization of the common naive theory that “time flies when

you’re having fun.” Given that attentional demands shorten
duration estimates (Block & Zakay, 1997; Chaston & Kingstone,
2004) and that highly enjoyable activities can monopolize
attention (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990), this intuitive
link between subjective time progression and hedonic experience does not seem terribly misinformed.2 When people are
faced with otherwise inexplicable time distortions, however,
overgeneralization of this presumed relationship may lead to
inappropriate causal inferences. Thus, we predict that the
sense that time “flew” will enhance people’s evaluations of
experiences, whereas the sense that time “dragged” will worsen
evaluations.
Numerous experiential cues have been shown to influence
evaluative judgments by prompting attributions (e.g., Schwarz
et al., 1991; Stepper & Strack, 1993, Whittlesea, 1993). Typically, such cues involve a cognitive experience (e.g., violation
of expectations) that leads to a process of sense making relying on theories about thinking, or metacognition. The imperfect
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nature of duration estimation suggests that time distortion may
be a common experience that prompts sense making, and people’s naive theories may provide a metacognitive attribution for
this experience. In the studies reported here, we tested whether
naive theories connecting enjoyment and time progression lead
people to infer enjoyment of experiences from surprising time
distortions. We first tested whether people evaluate experiences
more favorably when they think time passed more quickly
(Studies 1a, 1b, and 2). We then examined whether this effect
occurs because people attribute time distortions to the hedonic
value of the experience. We tested this hypothesized process by
manipulating the surprising nature of time progression (Study
3), by measuring (Study 4a) and manipulating (Study 4b)
beliefs in the connection between time progression and enjoyment, and by providing participants with an alternative
attribution for time distortions (Study 5).

Studies 1a and 1b: When Time
Flies, Tasks Are More Fun
In our first test, we manipulated external time cues while participants completed a mundane task. By manipulating actual
or alleged task duration, we created the illusion of fast or slow
time progression. For example, if someone engages in a task
for 5 (or 20) min but is told that 10 min have passed, that
person should be surprised by time’s progression—that is, he
or she should feel that time flew (or dragged) by. There are two
ways to execute this temporal discrepancy: (a) manipulating
actual duration while holding alleged duration constant and
(b) holding actual duration constant while manipulating alleged
duration. Study 1a used the former strategy, whereas Study 1b
used the latter. In both studies, we expected that participants
would evaluate the task more positively when time seemed
to pass surprisingly quickly than when time seemed to pass
surprisingly slowly.

Method
In Study 1a, university students (N = 37; 23 males, 14 females)
were paid for participating in a study ostensibly examining
cognitive processing. Each participant completed the study
individually. In each session, the participant was asked to set
aside all possible distractions, including watches and mobile
phones, thus leaving no external time cues. The experimenter
then provided selections of text and instructed the participant to
quickly and accurately underline all words containing doubleletter combinations (e.g., the word epigrammatic has double
ms). The participant was told that the task would last exactly 10
min. Upon instructing the participant to begin, the experimenter
conspicuously started a stopwatch and exited the room.
Outside the room, the experimenter exchanged her stopwatch for an identical one preset to approximately 10 min. In
the time-flies condition, she reentered the room after only 5
min had passed. In the time-drags condition, she reentered
after 20 min had passed. Upon reentering the room, however,

Table 1. Effects of the Time Manipulation on Felt Time Progression
(Manipulation Check) and Enjoyment Ratings in Studies 1a and 1b
Time condition
Rating
Felt time progression
Study 1a
Study 1b
Enjoyment
Study 1a
Study 1b

Time flies

Time drags

6.16 (1.21)
5.72 (1.12)

1.83 (0.71)
2.88 (1.20)

3.75 (1.29)
3.30 (1.20)

2.72 (1.38)
2.61 (0.87)

Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Within each row, the
means are significantly different from each other, ts > 2.35, ps < .025.

the experimenter announced that 10 min had passed and casually set the stopwatch reading 10 min next to the participant
while proceeding with instructions. The participant then used
7-point scales to rate the task in terms of enjoyment, challenge,
engagement, fun, skill required, and how excited he or she
would be to participate in a similar task in the future. As a
manipulation check, the participant also indicated how time
seemed to progress, using a 7-point scale (1 = time dragged, 4 =
pretty normal, 7 = time flew).
The procedure of Study 1b was identical to that of Study 1a,
except that all participants (N = 79; 34 males, 45 females)
spent the same amount of time (10 min) on the task. In the
time-flies condition, the alleged task duration was 20 min; in
the time-drags condition, it was 5 min.

Results
The results of Studies 1a and 1b are summarized in Table 1.
The manipulation was successful: Participants in the time-flies
conditions reported faster time progression than did participants in the time-drags conditions, t(35) = 13.14 in Study 1a
and t(77) = 10.86 in Study 1b, ps < .001, preps > .99. Ratings of
enjoyment, challenge, engagement, fun, skill required, and
excitement to reengage were highly related (α1a = .89, α1b =
.83) and were thus combined to create a composite measure of
enjoyment. As hypothesized, participants in the time-flies conditions rated the task as more enjoyable than did participants in
the time-drags conditions—Study 1a: t(35) = 2.36, p = .024,
prep = .92, d = 0.80; Study 1b: t(77) = 2.95, p = .006, prep = .97,
d = 0.67. Thus, the experience of time distortion affected evaluations of the task regardless of whether that experience was
induced by manipulating the actual (Study 1a) or alleged
(Study 1b) passage of time.

Study 2: When Time Flies, Noises
Are Less Irritating
Studies 1a and 1b suggest that experiences seem more enjoyable when time is felt to have progressed surprisingly quickly
and less enjoyable when time is felt to have progressed surprisingly slowly. In Study 2, we sought to test the robustness
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of these findings in three ways. First, whereas the word task
used in Studies 1a and 1b was of relatively neutral valence, we
wanted to examine whether time distortions also influence
evaluations of tasks that have strong (in this case, negative)
hedonic value.3 Second, the active participation required by
the word task may have induced flow (i.e., complete immersion in an active task—Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990), which
is associated with both increased enjoyment and reduced
awareness of time. Study 2 tested whether evaluations of a
passively experienced task, which is unlikely to induce flow,
can be similarly influenced by time distortions. Third, in Study
2, we manipulated subjective time progression in the presence
of external time cues; the presence of such features better simulates those naturalistic settings in which clocks and timers are
ubiquitous, but these features also might mitigate the influence
of subjective time distortions.

Method
Ninety-nine undergraduates (44 males, 55 females) participated in fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants sat at
a computer, donned headphones, and listened to a 30-s clip of
synchronized dot-matrix printers, taken from a track titled
“} . } @ }. @ . } @ } . @ . } @ } . @ . } @ } . @ . } @ } . @ . }”
([The User], 2002). The track was described as “printing
sounds” and was generally considered to be irritating. While
participants listened to the clip, a timer counting each second of
elapsed time was presented on the screen. To manipulate subjective time progression, we either accelerated (time flies) or
decelerated (time drags) the timer by 20%. Participants then
rated their experience on a 9-point scale with endpoints labeled
not unpleasant at all and very unpleasant, and rated their irritation with the sounds on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled
OK noise and terrible noise. Additionally, participants listened
to a 5-s sound clip of an electric drill and then indicated their
preference for listening to the printing sounds again versus listening to the drill instead; ratings were made on a 201-point
slider scale ranging from –100 (definitely would prefer the
printing noise) to +100 (definitely would prefer the drill sound).

Results
Because unpleasantness and irritation ratings were highly
related (α = .92), these two measures were standardized and
combined into a single composite variable (with larger values
indicating more negative ratings). Results were consistent with
those of Studies 1a and 1b; participants in the time-flies condition (M = –0.39) rated their listening experience less negatively
than did participants in the time-drags condition (M = 0.53),
F(1, 97) = 5.67, p = .019, prep = .95, ηp2 = .06. Furthermore,
participants were less willing to switch from printing sounds to
a different irritating noise (electric-drill sounds) if they were in
the time-flies condition (M = –25.6) than if they were in the
time-drags condition (M = 11.9), F(1, 97) = 6.17,
p = .015, prep = .96, ηp2 = .06. These results again indicate that

people evaluate an experience more positively if time seems to
pass surprisingly quickly rather than surprisingly slowly—even
when the experience is clearly unpleasant, there is no active participation, and there is continuous temporal feedback.

Study 3: When Time Flies, Good
Songs Get Better
We have argued that the accelerated passage of time leads to
feelings of time distortion, which are then attributed to greater
subjective enjoyment. However, Studies 1a, 1b, and 2 left open
the possibility that subjective time progression influences
enjoyment directly (e.g., fast subjective time progression might
be inherently pleasant). The remaining studies tested our proposed attribution explanation by manipulating the need for
attribution (Study 3), by measuring and manipulating the
strength of participants’ naive theory connecting time progression and enjoyment (Studies 4a and 4b), and by manipulating
the presence of an alternative attribution (Study 5).
People typically seek explanations for subjective experiences only when the experiences diverge surprisingly from
expectations (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). Study 3 used a
procedure similar to that of Study 2 but manipulated the surprising nature of the time progression by varying whether the
timer counted up (elapsed time) or down (remaining time). If
subjective time progression influences enjoyment of an experience directly, then any felt acceleration or deceleration of
time should influence participants’ ratings of the experience.
In contrast, if a sense-making process is involved, then effects
on enjoyment ratings should be observed only when time’s
progress is surprising. When the timer counted up, the alleged
duration was unknown at the beginning and became apparent
only as the experience concluded, resulting in surprise at the
discrepancy between alleged and expected elapsed time. When
the timer counted down, however, participants learned the
(alleged) duration before the experience began. By the time
the endpoint (0:00) arrived, it was unsurprising and therefore
required no sense making.
Additionally, Study 3 involved a clearly pleasant hedonic
experience. This allowed us to test whether fast time progression can not only make less-than-pleasant experiences seem
more tolerable, but can also make pleasant experiences seem
more enjoyable. It is possible that pleasant experiences are
less enjoyable (and more stressful) when time flies, because
people would prefer positive experiences to be extended rather
than abbreviated. However, if people use subjective time progression to infer enjoyment, then the experience of time flying
should enhance both unpleasant and pleasant experiences, and
the experience of time dragging should worsen both unpleasant and pleasant experiences.

Method
University students (N = 106; 72 males, 34 females) were paid
to participate in a study in which they chose their favorite song
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from 12 popular selections (e.g., “Crazy” by Gnarls Barkley)
and evaluated that song using a 201-point slider scale (–100 =
I really hate it, +100 = I really love it). After completing an
unrelated filler study, participants listened to their chosen
song. The song timer was displayed on the computer screen; it
was either accelerated or decelerated by 20% and displayed
either elapsed time or remaining time. Participants then
reported their enjoyment on a 9-point scale with endpoints did
not enjoy it at all and enjoyed it tremendously and rated the
song on an 11-point scale with endpoints terrible song and
fantastic song.

Results
To control for prior song liking, we used initial song rating as
a covariate in all analyses. Postlistening enjoyment ratings and
song evaluations were highly related (α = .94) and were standardized and combined into a single composite. There were no
main effects of timer speed or direction on this composite
measure, Fs < 1, ps > .30. However, as expected, timer speed
and direction showed a reliable interaction, F(1, 173) = 4.50,
p = .035, prep = .93, ηp2 = .03. When the timer displayed elapsed
time, participants reported enjoying the song more in the timeflies condition (M = 0.54) than in the time-drags condition
(M = –0.44), F(1, 173) = 4.21, p = .042, prep = .92, ηp2 = .05.
This effect was eliminated when the timer displayed the
remaining time (Ms = –0.22 and 0.13), F < 1, p > .30. Thus,
when the timer displayed elapsed time, even a pleasant experience seemed more enjoyable when time passed surprisingly
quickly (vs. surprisingly slowly). However, consistent with an
attributional account, this effect disappeared when the timer
displayed remaining time—and thus removed the experience
of surprise.

Studies 4a and 4b: Measuring and
Manipulating Naive Theories
We have proposed that to make sense of surprising time distortion, people implicitly rely on a belief that time passes more
quickly during more enjoyable experiences. If this is true, then
the effects of time distortion should depend on the strength of
this belief. In the next two studies, we measured (Study 4a)
and manipulated (Study 4b) participants’ belief in the naive
theory that “time flies when you’re having fun.” The more
strongly people endorse this naive theory, the more likely they
should be to attribute surprising time progression to
enjoyment.

Study 4a
Method. Students from two universities (N = 109) were paid
for participating in either a paper-based (n = 43) or a
computer-based (n = 66) study. All participants were told that
they would be evaluating anagram puzzles for future research.
Participants first indicated their general liking of anagrams on

an 11-point scale (–5 = dislike very much, +5 = like very much).
Next, they were presented with a list of 45 five-letter anagrams
and asked to solve as many as possible in 10 min (time flies) or
in 5 min (time drags). They then worked on the anagram task
for exactly 7.5 min, after which they were told that 10 or 5 min
had passed, either by the program (in the computer-based version) or by the experimenter showing them a preset stopwatch
(in the paper-based version). Next, participants indicated their
enjoyment of the anagram task on a 7-point scale (1 = did not
enjoy it at all, 7 = enjoyed it a great deal). After answering
some filler questions, participants indicated their belief that
“time flies when you’re having fun” by using a 7-point scale to
rate the extent to which the saying holds in real life (1 = it
never holds, 7 = it always holds). The study concluded with a
funnel debriefing procedure that probed for suspicion regarding the time manipulation.
Results. All analyses used participants’ prior self-reported
liking of anagrams as a covariate. The computer-based and
paper-based groups did not differ in their reported enjoyment
of the task, nor did this factor interact with the time effect (Fs <
1, ps > .30). We therefore present analyses of the pooled data.
Once again, participants in the time-flies condition (M = 4.62)
reported enjoying the experience more than did participants in
the time-drags condition (M = 4.10), F(1, 106) = 8.58, p = .004,
prep = .97, ηp2 = .07. Moreover, the effect of the time manipulation was significantly more pronounced among participants
with a stronger belief that “time flies when you’re having fun,”
β = 0.33, t(103) = 2.57, p = .012, prep = .95, ηp2 = .06.
We also examined debriefing responses to assess whether
participants were indeed unaware of the inaccuracy of the
timing instructions. Of the 109 participants, 5 suspected a
timing inaccuracy after this possibility was suggested to them.
Removing these participants from the analyses did not change
any of the conclusions.

Study 4b
Method. Sixty-four university students (31 males, 33 females)
were recruited for a paid study in which they would be asked to
recall details from news articles. To manipulate participants’
belief in the “time flies” naive theory, we presented them with a
fabricated article reporting scientific evidence that either supported this belief or refuted it. All participants also read an
additional (real) article (Ansari, 2008) unrelated to our hypothesis. They then completed the word task described in Study 1a,
which was ostensibly a filler task before the recall portion of the
study. The time manipulation and task rating procedures were
identical to those of Study 1a. After rating the task, participants
were asked to rate how convincing each article was, using a
7-point scale (1 = not at all convincing, 7 = extremely convincing). The study concluded with a funnel debriefing interview.
Results. There was no main effect of article condition on task
enjoyment ratings (composite α = .83), F < 1, p > .30, and
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Method
Time Flies (5 min)

5

Time Drags (20 min)

4
3
2
1

Supporting Naive
Theory

Refuting Naive
Theory

Article Condition
Fig. 1. Mean task enjoyment in Study 4b as a function of the manipulations
of subjective time progression (time flies vs. time drags) and belief in the
naive theory that “time flies when you’re having fun.” Error bars indicate
±1 SEM.

participants rated the two articles about the experience of time
as similarly convincing, F(1, 59) = 2.28, p = .14. Participants
reported enjoying the task more in the time-flies condition
than in the time-drags condition, F(1, 60) = 21.51, p < .001,
prep > .99, but more important, this effect was moderated by the
manipulation of belief in the naive theory, F(1, 60) = 5.94, p =
.018, prep = .95, ηp2 = .09 (see Fig. 1). Participants who read the
article confirming their naive theory reported enjoying the
word task more in the time-flies condition (M = 3.73) than in
the time-drags condition (M = 1.95), t(33) = 5.16, p < .001,
prep > .99, d = 1.75. No such effect was observed among participants who read the refuting article (Mflies = 2.89, Mdrags =
2.34), t(27) = 1.52, p = .14, d = 0.57.
In the funnel debriefing, 10 participants voiced some suspicion of timing inaccuracies after this possibility was suggested
to them. Removing these participants from the analyses did
not change any of the conclusions.

Study 5: Providing Alternative Attributions
for Time Distortion
We have argued that people attribute surprising time distortions to their enjoyment of the experience, using their naive
theory about the relationship between time progression and
enjoyment. If this is the case, then the effect of time distortion
on hedonic evaluations should occur only in the absence of a
reasonable alternative explanation for the distortion (see
Schwarz, 2004). Study 5 tested this hypothesis by providing
some participants with an alternative attribution for their experienced time distortion.

As in Study 1a, university students (N = 60; 23 males, 37
females) spent either 5 or 20 min on a task identified as taking
exactly 10 min. The design of Study 5 differed from that of
Study 1a in three ways. First, all participants wore foam earplugs as part of a cover story about reducing external
distractions. Second, at the beginning of the task evaluation
questionnaire, half of the participants were presented with a
mock survey question designed to suggest that wearing earplugs may make time seem to fly (or drag, depending on time
condition). The remaining half of the participants did not see
this questionnaire item. Third, at the end of the task evaluation
questionnaire, all participants were asked to indicate whether
they would like to participate in a future study involving a
60-min version of the same word judgment task.

Results
Participants reported that time progressed faster in the
time-flies condition (M = 6.25) than in the time-drags condition (M = 2.47), F(1, 56) = 119.35, p < .001, prep > .99.
The explanation manipulation did not influence this measure,
Fs < 1, ps > .30.
Participants reported greater enjoyment (composite α =
.81) if time flew than if time dragged, F(1, 56) = 12.11, p <
.001, prep = .99, ηp2 = .18, but this effect was moderated by the
presence of an alternative attribution, F(1, 56) = 4.10, p = .048,
prep = .88, ηp2 = .07 (see Fig. 2). In the absence of an alternative

6

Mean Task Enjoyment Rating

Mean Task Enjoyment Rating

6

Time Flies (5 min)
Time Drags (20 min)

5
4
3
2
1

No Earplugs
Explanation

Earplugs
Explanation

Explanation Condition
Fig. 2. Mean task enjoyment in Study 5 as a function of the manipulations
of subjective time progression (time flies vs. time drags) and the availability
of an alternative explanation for the experienced time distortion. Error bars
indicate ±1 SEM.
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attribution, participants reported greater task enjoyment in the
time-flies condition (M = 4.71) than in the time-drags condition (M = 2.81), t(30) = 3.94, p < .001, prep > .99, d = 1.44, but
when participants were provided with the alternative, earplugs
explanation, this effect was eliminated (Mflies = 3.57, Mdrags =
3.36), t(26) = 1.02, p = .32. Furthermore, participants in the
no-explanation condition were more likely to volunteer for a
future study involving the task if they were in the time-flies
condition (93%) than if they were in the time-drags condition
(61%), χ2(1, N = 32) = 4.23, p = .040, prep = .93, whereas volunteer rates in the earplugs-explanation condition were not
significantly influenced by the time manipulation (Ms = 79%
and 71%), χ2(1, N = 28) = 0.19, p = .66.

arousal (e.g., Gruber & Block, 2003) or inattention to temporal
cues (e.g., Curton & Lordahl, 1974), might influence people’s
hedonic judgments in ways previously not understood. The
current research thus provides insight into new ways to
improve people’s subjective enjoyment of a wide range of
experiences, particularly negative experiences (e.g., waiting)
that are virtually inevitable in day-to-day life.
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General Discussion
Subjective time progression influences hedonic evaluation.
Feelings of time distortion can cue inferences of enjoyment,
but only when subjective time progression is surprising (Study
3), when one holds the belief that enjoyment accelerates time
progression (Studies 4a and 4b), and when no alternative attributions are available (Study 5). We suggest that subjective
time progression serves as input into a metacognitive judgment mechanism and thus plays a role similar to that of other
metacognitive experiences, such as fluency and accessibility
(for reviews, see Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Clore,
2007; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007). Furthermore,
the present findings extend previous research suggesting that
people often neglect the duration of events when judging
hedonic value (e.g., Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; but see
Ariely & Loewenstein, 2000). Consistent with speculation that
people might overcome duration neglect when they become
attentive to time (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993), our data
suggest that although people might neglect true duration when
making hedonic judgments, surprising discrepancies between
expected and actual durations significantly influence hedonic
evaluations.
Notably, however, because our studies compared accelerated time with decelerated time, it is impossible to distinguish
positive effects of accelerated time progression from negative
effects of decelerated time progression. We therefore conducted
an additional investigation (N = 59) comparing song ratings
obtained under an accelerated timer with those obtained under
a regular timer, using the elapsed-time condition from Study 3.
As predicted, participants in the time-flies condition reported
enjoying the song more (M = 0.46) than did those in the regular-time condition (M = –0.31), F(1, 56) = 7.67, p = .008, prep >
.99, ηp2 = .14. This result suggests that experiences can be
improved simply by accelerating subjective time progression.
Taken together, these findings have important implications
for understanding and changing hedonic experience. As recent
work suggests, there is value in increasing subjective enjoyment without changing core features of the task at hand (see
Hsee, Hastie, & Chen, 2008). Extraneous variables that systematically shorten duration estimates, such as physiological
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Notes
1. Duration estimates may be inaccurate for numerous reasons (see,
e.g., Jones & Boltz, 1989; Zakay & Block, 1997). However, the studies we report in this article focused on the hedonic consequences of
experiencing time distortion, independent of what caused the time
distortion itself.
2. We define “subjective time progression” as the relative pace at
which time seems to have passed from the perceiver’s standpoint.
3. We later used a positive hedonic experience (Study 3).
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